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Abstract
This article uses survey data of 90,000 union employees working in 62 publicly-traded
companies in Japan between 1990 and 2004 to study the effect of both own and self-reported
reference wages on workers’ subjective well-being levels. The availability of self-reported ref-
erence wages generates very robust findings that do not depend on questionable identifying
assumptions. These findings confirm that higher estimates by workers of their peers’ earn-
ings are associated with lower levels of life and job satisfaction. These comparison effects
are statistically and economically strong but are smaller in absolute value than the impact
of workers’ own wages on their own utility. We compare our results with standard tests of
the relative utility hypothesis in the literature that recur to alternative proxies for compar-
ison wages, including: (i) Mincer-predicted wages; (ii) cell averages defined over different
groups within our dataset; (iii) cell wage averages estimated from an external data source;
and (iv) colleagues’ average wages. In spite of their potential flaws—that we discuss—these
alternative empirical constructs employed in the literature do not introduce a simple classical
measurement error problem and the bias attributed to this measurement error issue can go
in both directions. We propose a simple IV strategy when the self-reported reference wage is
not available that does not eliminate the bias but delivers a lower bound of the “true” effect.
We also address the issue of endogeneity of self-reported reference wages in our subjective
well-being regressions by accounting for workers’ pessimistic attitudes at the workplace.
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1 Introduction
The relative utility hypothesis (Duesenberry, 1949) posits that individuals derive utility not only
from their own levels of consumption but also from how much they consume relative to a well-
defined benchmark group. In the last decade, numerous studies have found empirical support for
this theory, documenting the existence of an inverse relationship between an individual’s reported
level of happiness and the income or wages earned by his peers.1 However, there is still consid-
erable disagreement regarding the magnitude of these relative effects. In particular, some studies
have argued that the impact of comparison income on individuals’ well-being is both statisti-
cally and economically stronger than that of absolute income—a result that goes against standard
neoclassical theories of consumption.
One difficulty in evaluating and comparing the findings in the literature is the different defini-
tions of relative income. One approach is to estimate a Mincer equation that allows the econome-
trician to predict the wage of an individual with given characteristics. This predicted wage then
becomes the relative measure to which individuals compare. An alternative method is to calculate
average wages by cells or groups defined by age, gender, education level, and other particular
individual characteristics. In general, all of these approaches implicitly assume that individuals
compare themselves to a hypothetical “average” individual with given characteristics and that
they infer their peers’ wages the way econometricians do (Manski, 1993; Sloane and Williams,
2000). More specifically, each method has potential drawbacks. For example, studies that recur to
the Mincer solution must identify the reference wage effect on happiness by including additional
variables in the wage regression that are excluded from the happiness equation. These exclusion
restrictions are frequently unjustified and easily refutable.
This paper empirically tests the relative utility hypothesis and assesses the validity of the
different methodologies that the literature has employed to construct comparison income measures.
We study the relationship between subjective well-being and both absolute and relative wages by
using data on about 90,000 Japanese workers surveyed in repeated annual cross-sections between
1990 and 2004. Our analysis overcomes some of the criticisms that previous studies have faced, as
we employ data on workers’ actual perceptions of their peers’ wages instead of theoretical constructs
that may not correspond to the “true” benchmark that individuals use to compare themselves to
their reference group. Our results show that individuals report higher levels of both job and
life satisfaction when their individual absolute income levels are higher. We also demonstrate the
existence of significant relative income effects, as workers experience greater satisfaction when they
perceive that their own wages are higher relative to their peers’. The impact of relative income is
consistently smaller in absolute value than the effect of absolute income on reported well-being.
However, we demonstrate that the absolute and, in particular, the relative effects are much stronger
for workers who are better able to accurately predict their peers’ wages—a result that we associate
with feelings of jealousy and with workers’ access to information about job offers and the wage
structure in their profession. Our analysis also addresses the possibility of endogenous self-reported
reference wages due to underlying pessimistic attitudes that may be correlated with individuals’
subjective well-being measures.
Having confirmed the robustness of our results using self-reported reference wages, we then re-
estimate the model using instead the theoretical comparison income measures that the literature
has employed. Our findings show that the estimated effects of reference wages on well-being are
not consistent when using constructed reference wages as proxies for the comparison wage that is
1For an excellent exposition of recent developments in the economics literature and the validity and applicability
of happiness measures in economics, see Kahneman and Krueger (2006).
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actually perceived by the worker. We estimate the bias in these estimates by means of a general-
ized version of the classical measurement error model and show that the direction of the bias is
ambiguous. We propose a simple instrumental-variables strategy that can be implemented when
self-reported comparison wages are not available. This approach does not eliminate the measure-
ment error bias, although it delivers a lower bound—in absolute value—of the “true” impact of
reference wages on well-being. Our analysis also suggests that the use of Mincer-predicted reference
wages—one of the traditional comparison wage measures employed in previous literature—must
be avoided whenever possible, as this method tends to yield highly unstable results mainly due to
its reliance on questionable identification assumptions.
Additionally, our paper also documents the relationship between subjective well-being and in-
dividual characteristics of workers in Japan. Our analysis compares these results with those in
previous studies, which have focused primarily on the U.S. and the western European labor forces.
Our findings confirm several standard results in the happiness literature. For instance, women and
married workers tend to report higher levels of satisfaction than men and single individuals, re-
spectively. However, we also observe a U-shaped relationship between satisfaction and educational
attainment, which contrasts starkly with the monotonically increasing association in the U.S. and
Europe found in past studies. Given that, to the best of our knowledge, our paper is one of the
first happiness studies in Japan, our findings are useful in the construction of a set of stylized facts
that may be generalizable to cultures outside of the western hemisphere.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief synthesis of the literature and
places this study in its historical context. In Section 3, we present our empirical framework to
test the relative utility hypothesis, introduce our data, and explain how they differ from previous
data sets on job satisfaction and happiness. Section 4 presents our main results focusing on the
use of workers’ expectations on their peers’ wages as our primary comparison income measure.
In Section 5, we re-estimate the model employing alternative metrics used in the literature and
compare the results. We also demonstrate from a theoretical standpoint why the bias present in
estimations that employ these theoretical constructs as reference income proxies may go in either
direction and propose our instrumental variables approach to bound the reference wage estimate.
Finally, Section 6 presents some concluding remarks.
2 Literature Review
In a seminal paper, Easterlin (1974) analyzed the results of thirty individual-level surveys im-
plemented in nineteen different countries between 1946 and 1970, and observed that there is a
noticeable positive association between income and happiness within countries. That is, in each
country survey, individuals in the highest income brackets tend to report, on average, significantly
greater levels of happiness relative to those in lower income categories. However, this association
is not visible among countries: at any given point in time, the differences in happiness between
richer and poorer nations are negligible.2 Similarly, although income per capita rose steadily in
the United States during this period, average reported happiness showed no increasing trend and
even declined between 1960 and 1970. Easterlin (1974) explained this paradox by alluding to
Duesenberry’s (1949) relative utility theory, which suggests that people often compare themselves
to a reference group, and so they care not only about their own absolute consumption levels, but
about how much they consume relative to that benchmark. Thus, Easterlin (1974) concluded that
2For further relative utility tests using national average data, see Easterlin (1995) and Easterlin (2001).
3
a higher average income level in a richer country or within a country over time increases overall
aspirations of all individuals, negating the expected positive impact on welfare.
These results prompted the economics literature to investigate further the impact of absolute
and relative income on subjective well-being measures.3 Van de Stadt et al. (1985) investigate
this from a theoretical perspective by means of a dynamic model of habit formation and utility
interdependence. They estimate the model using two waves of an annual panel in the Netherlands
and conclude that their findings are compatible with the hypothesis that utility is completely
relative. However, their estimates cannot exclude the possibility that utility is partly relative and
partly absolute.4 From an empirical perspective, this discussion was later revived following an
article by Clark and Oswald (1996). Using job satisfaction data from the British Household Panel
Survey, the authors find a strong correlation between job satisfaction and different measures of
comparison income. More than that, they also observe that workers’ reported levels of well-being
are at best weakly correlated with absolute income, which supports the findings by Easterlin (1974)
twenty years earlier.
In the subsequent empirical literature, the evidence on these issues has been mixed. In agree-
ment with Clark and Oswald (1996), the majority of the studies find a negative relationship be-
tween satisfaction and various comparison income variables, while observing an own-income effect
that is either relatively smaller in absolute value or statistically insignificant (Sloane and Williams
2000; McBride 2001; Ferrer-i Carbonell 2005; Brown et al. 2008). Using a panel of Russian in-
dividuals between 1994 and 2000, Senik (2004) also shows that the effect of individual income
is smaller in magnitude than that of reference income, although she observes that reference in-
come exerts a positive influence on satisfaction. She argued that these findings are consistent
with Hirschman and Rothschild’s (1973) “tunnel effect” conjecture, whereby rising inequality may
increase welfare if it is interpreted as a positive signal with respect to likely future outcomes.
Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) used samples of British and U.S. workers to show a strong pos-
itive correlation between personal income and satisfaction, concluding that “money buys happi-
ness.” They also found that relative income had some explanatory power in a happiness equation,
although this was not enough to explain away their findings in support of the Easterlin hypothesis.
Perhaps implicitly shedding some light on the reasons behind these disparate findings, Luttmer
(2005) emphasized the relevance of the definition of the reference group. He finds evidence of an
inverse relationship between individual well-being and other people’s earnings, but this relation-
ship is much stronger for people who socialize more with neighbors than for people who interact
more with friends outside the neighborhood.
One reason that could potentially explain away such discrepancies in the various findings in
the literature is the difficulty in obtaining an appropriate reference wage measure. First, it is not
obvious who belongs in the comparison group.5 Do workers compare themselves to other workers
3Discussions on these topics have been widespread in the psychology literature. For instance, see Veenhoven
(1991), Diener et al. (1993), and Boyce et al. (2010).
4Their model is based on a previous paper by Van Praag (1968) that demonstrates theoretically that every
individual can evaluate his welfare position with respect to his income level on a bounded scale, and that a description
of this evaluation can be given by a log-normal individual income welfare function. More recently, Rayo and Becker
(2007b) combined a happiness function with habit formation and peer comparisons to argue that utility levels
depend not only on our current consumption but also on our personal histories and social environment.
5For example, Falk and Knell (2004) argue that reference groups used as benchmarks may be endogenous. Also,
using data on workers’ perceptions about their competition, Clark and Senik (2010) show that workers tend to
compare more often to their own colleagues, while comparisons to their friends are less common. From a theoretical
standpoint, Rayo and Becker (2007a) model happiness as a function with a time-varying reference point, and show
how both habits and peer comparisons arise as special cases of this process.
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in the same company? In the same industry? To their relatives and friends? To their neighbors?
To people of their same age and education level? To workers of the opposite sex? The possibilities
are vast. A second and perhaps more subtle issue is that, ideally, the econometrician would like to
have information on workers’ perceptions about their peers’ wages but such self-reported beliefs
are typically unobserved.6
As Clark et al. (2008) have pointed out, the bulk of the literature has defined relative income
as income earned by people with similar individual characteristics—such as age, education, or civil
status—and confined to a common social sphere—e.g., same company, same neighborhood, or do-
ing the same kind of job. These comparison income measures are generally constructed in a number
of ways, which include: (i) predicting individual wages from Mincer equations (Clark and Oswald
1996; Sloane and Williams 2000; Le´vy-Garboua and Montmarquette 2004; Senik 2004); (ii) calcu-
lating cell averages according to specific individual characteristics within-sample (Ferrer-i Carbonell
2005) or (iii) out-of-sample from external data (Cappelli and Sherer 1988; McBride 2001; Luttmer
2005; Clark et al. 2009a; Card et al. 2010); and (iv) computing average wages of workers’ colleagues
(Rizzo and Zeckhauser 2003; Brown et al. 2008; Clark et al. 2009b).
These approaches present several potential problems. For instance, studies that estimate com-
parison income by imputing peers’ wages from Mincer equations implicitly assume that individu-
als will infer peers’ wages the way econometricians do (Manski 1993; Sloane and Williams 2000).
Moreover, this methodology relies heavily on questionable identification assumptions. In particular,
Mincer regressions from which the predicted reference income measures are derived must include
variables that are excluded from the satisfaction equation, an exclusion restriction that is often
not warranted.7 More generally, these methods presuppose that individuals compare themselves
to a hypothetical average worker within well-defined categories defined by the econometrician, an
assumption that is difficult to validate.8
To better understand the drawbacks in the literature, the next section discusses in more detail
the empirical framework that we will follow to test the relative utility hypothesis.
3 Empirical Framework and Data Description
In order to examine the impact of absolute and relative wages on subjective well-being, researchers
typically estimate the following regression:
(1) SWBi = α1yi + β1y¯i + x
′
i
γ + ui,
where the dependent variable SWBi represents a measure of worker i’s subjective well-being, such
as happiness or job satisfaction. This proxy for utility is assumed to depend on the worker’s (log)
wage, yi;
9 a (log) reference wage that workers use as a benchmark to determine how well they do
6Recent studies by Knight et al. (2009) and Senik (2009) use data on individuals’ perceptions about their rivals’
income. However, these relative income measures are ordinal, which are generally not appropriate in relative utility
tests.
7Table A-1 shows a comparison of the results obtained by a selection of papers in the literature employing various
reference income measures.
8Relative utility tests that are based on “hypothetical choice experiments” may overcome these issues since
rivals and reference income levels are well-defined for survey participants in such experiments. See, for example,
Solnick and Hemenway (1998); Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002); Alpizar et al. (2005); Carlsson et al. (2009). The
general conclusion in these studies show that relative income effects are about as important as absolute income
effects. See also Yamada and Sato (2010) for hypothetical choice experiments evidence from Japan suggesting that,
on average, utility is only partly relative.
9Unless otherwise noted, all wages are in logs.
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relative to their peers, y¯i; and a vector of individual characteristics, xi, that includes age, tenure,
gender, educational attainment, marital status, among other socio-demographic factors. As usual,
the term ui corresponds to an idiosyncratic error term.
10
One advantage that we have over previous studies is that our dataset contains information on
workers’ actual perceptions about their peers’ wages. Assuming that these self-reported reference
wages correspond to the true benchmark that workers use to compare themselves against their
peers, we can estimate equation 1 by standard methods11 and obtain an unbiased measurement
of the effect of relative wages on subjective well-being.12 We present these findings in Section 4.
Our data also allow us to compare our results to the ones we would have obtained had we followed
the alternative methodologies that Manski (1993), Sloane and Williams (2000), and others have
deemed potentially flawed. These findings are reported in Section 5.
3.1 Data Description
Our dataset comes from the Comprehensive Survey of Labor Union Members, which was designed
and administered by a group of psychologists at the International Economy and Work Research
Institute. It comprises repeated cross-sections on about 90,000 union members working in Japanese
firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) from 1990 to 2004. The survey requests that
respondents provide self-assessments on their individual well-being at work and in life in general.
In addition to this, other questions attempt to obtain information on workers’ perceptions of
their work environment.13 The dataset also allows us to control for individual demographic and
socioeconomic characteristics, which include age, gender, educational attainment, marital status,
annual wage level, overtime hours worked, and workers’ expectations of their peers’ wages.
After cleaning the data and removing some inconsistencies, we are left with 78,136 observa-
10This specification can be thought of as a reduced-form version of a standard utility function of the form:
U = U(c, c¯, h),
where c is individual consumption, c¯ is the level of consumption of a comparison group, and h is hours worked.
The theoretical literature has investigated how much keeping-up-with-the-Joneses ultimately matters to consumers
and what role social status plays in determining individual utility levels. These studies find that, in addition
to their own levels of consumption, individuals care about their peers’ consumption levels and their wealth rank
relative to their comparison group, which validates the use of reduced-form models such as equation 1. For instance,
see Cole et al. (1992); Corneo and Jeanne (1997); and Yamada (2008). Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) and Oswald
(1983) theoretically analyze tax policy implications of relative utility, while Abel (1990); Bakshi and Chen (1996);
Gali (1994); and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) examined such relative effects on asset pricing. Frank (1985) and
Frank (2005) show that relative concerns are more important for positional goods consumption than other goods
such as leisure, and that the structure of utility functions with relative concerns over different types of goods is of
key importance in the valuations of social welfare.
11Given the discrete, hierarchical nature of the dependent variable, the vast majority of happiness studies in
economics have estimated equations similar to 1 using ordered logit or probit estimators. However, it is not clear
that these methods are superior to ordinary least-squares since additional assumptions required for these estimates
to be valid—such as that of parallel slopes—are often not met. Further, Luttmer (2005) showed that results from
happiness equations obtained by OLS are virtually indistinguishable from those obtained by ordered models. Our
OLS estimates in Section 4 facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients, although ordered probit estimates are
also reported in the robustness section for completeness.
12This of course requires that the typical exogeneity assumptions hold. Our robustness tests in Section 4 address
the possibility that wages are endogenous.
13The full list of question categories is available in an earlier version of this paper; see Appendix 1 in
de la Garza et al. (2008)
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tions.14 Table 1 shows some statistics that describe our dataset. Workers in our sample are young
with an average age of 35 years. Their average tenure is 14 years, which suggests relatively low
mobility in the Japanese labor force. Moreover, union workers in Japan seem to be well-educated in
general, as almost all of them have graduated from high school, close to 50 percent have some col-
lege experience, and 36 percent have completed at least a university-level degree. We also observe
that 58 percent of workers are married and work an average of 23 hours of overtime per month.
All of these individuals are regular full-time employees and union members. About one-third of
them holds blue-collar positions and close to one-fifth of them performs some managerial role in
the company. These numbers do not intend to provide an accurate depiction of the representa-
tive Japanese worker since, as described above, the survey was administered exclusively to union
members employed by major publicly-traded companies. Thus, the results below may not be gen-
eralizable to the entire Japanese labor force—for instance, our dataset does not cover employees in
high administrative positions as they are not allowed to take part in unions. Nonetheless, due to
the large size of our sample and the breadth of coverage of 62 firms across a variety of industries
from food to electronics to finance, we believe that this dataset does capture significant features
of the Japanese labor market.
One additional consideration is that our database underrepresents women in the Japanese labor
force. According to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, women represent about 40
percent of the country’s working population; in contrast, the share of female participation in our
working sample is only 22 percent. This is an important issue because male and female workers
differ significantly along several dimensions. Table 1 shows some of these gender differences in
terms of observable characteristics, such as education and marital status. For instance, while 40
percent of the male subsample obtained a college degree, only 20 percent of the female group
achieved this goal. Interestingly, the fraction of married men is twice the proportion of married
women (66 percent vs. 33 percent). Since the literature has found significant correlations between
various subjective well-being measures and individual characteristics such as gender, educational
attainment, and marital status, pooling the male and female subsamples in our analysis may lead
to results that would differ had we considered these two groups separately. We thus keep this
distinction in mind and discuss these differences accordingly.
3.1.1 Subjective-Well Being
Each respondent provides information on his own subjective well-being by choosing one of five
possible categories, from “least satisfied” (category 1) to “most satisfied” (category 5). We employ
primarily two distinct subjective well-being measures, life happiness and job satisfaction, which
present some significant differences.15 First, the correlation between the two is only 27 percent.
As Figure 1 suggests, the distribution of life happiness is more spread out and more skewed to
the left than that of job satisfaction. Since the literature has utilized a wide variety of subjective
14The reduction in the number of observations is mainly due to missing information for some of the variables used
in the empirical analysis. Observations that showed inconsistencies in the data, such as the worker’s tenure being
greater than his age, were also dropped from the sample. To ensure that these problems were not due to sample
selection on observable characteristics, we compared the full-sample and the working databases along different
dimensions including age, education, wages, and reported levels of happiness and job satisfaction. We are happy to
report that we were unable to find any statistically significant differences between the two datasets.
15At the beginning of the questionnaire workers are first told “from now on, we would like to ask about your
general happiness,” and are asked to report whether they agree with the statement “I’m very happy!” in general.
Later in the questionnaire, workers are asked to report about their satisfaction with respect to all aspects of their
job.
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well-being measures, the availability of these two variables allows us to test the robustness of our
results. For brevity, the empirical analysis below highlights our findings utilizing life happiness
as the dependent variable. However, our results are robust to the use of job satisfaction as an
alternative proxy for subjective well-being.
3.1.2 Workers’ Own Wages
The survey also requests that workers mark down their own wage level from a list of 9 categories,
where category 1 denotes annual wages of under 2 million yen and category 9 corresponds to
an annual income level of over 10 million yen. We measure individual wages as the mid-point
in each of the 7 intermediate categories, and use ad hoc values for the two extreme categories.
Thus, respondents who reported categories 1, 2, . . . , 9 as their wage level, were assigned annual
wages of 1.5; 2.5; . . . ; 12 million yen, respectively. Alternative choices do not alter the main
results. Additionally, we deflate this nominal measure using the Consumer Price Index to obtain
real wages with 1990 as the base year.
One salient feature of wages in our sample of union workers in Japan is that individual char-
acteristics explain an atypically high fraction of the variation in wages. Table 2 shows standard
Mincer regressions for men and women, separately. Wage regressions for the male subsample that
control for age, tenure, education, hours worked, and marital status, obtain R2 measures of about
70 percent.16 In contrast, similar specifications for a sample of U.S. workers would generally yield
an R2 of about 30-35 percent. This high coefficient of determination in the Japanese data may
be partly due to the very strict seniority system that prevails in the Japanese labor market. For
instance, the correlation between wages and age for the full sample of Japanese workers is 69
percent. Using a comparable sample of unionized workers from the Current Population Survey
during the same 1990-2004 period, the corresponding correlation measure for the U.S. is only 21
percent. This high coefficient of determination in the Japanese sample may play to our advantage
as it reduces possible concerns that wages may depend themselves on happiness, thus minimizing
potential endogeneity issues. We nevertheless address this possibility in Section 4.
3.1.3 Self-Reported vs. Constructed Reference Wages
Survey respondents provide information on self-reported comparison wages by answering the ques-
tion, “What do you think is the average wage of corporate employees who are the same age as you
and doing the same job?” Just as in the case of workers’ own wages, answers to this question are
originally chosen from a list of 9 categories, then matched with individual wage values according
to the category mid-points described above. In contrast with the reference wage measures em-
ployed in previous studies, the availability of self-reported comparison wages allows us to gauge
how workers perceive their peers’ wages. We refer to this self-reported measure as the worker’s
“true” reference wage to distinguish it from the alternative empirical constructs that the literature
has traditionally utilized.
To better understand the differences between self-reported and constructed wage measures,
we compare our relative wage measure as reported by the worker to some of the most common
reference wage estimates used in other studies. A standard method consists in calculating wage
averages by cells or groups defined by a set of given observable characteristics of workers. We define
16This feature depends only marginally on wages being reported in categories. When we smooth wages adding a
disturbance term that is uniformly distributed between each cutoff point the R2 statistic decreases by, at most, 5
percentage points.
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cells in three different ways: by gender and age; by gender, age, and education level; and by gender,
age, education level, and managerial experience. Following the literature, we estimate these cell
averages from two different underlying data sources: our own dataset, described above, and an
external dataset containing wage information of workers with similar observable characteristics.
This second approach is most commonly employed in the literature and is useful to validate our
results. The external data correspond to wages for individuals working in large companies with
over 1,000 employees, as provided by the Basic Survey on Wage Structure (BSWS) released by
the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.17 A third method that is frequently used
in relative utility studies is to estimate Mincer regressions such as the ones showed in Table 2.
The theoretical comparison wage measure corresponds to the fitted wage value of the average
worker. In what follows we use the prediction from a wage regression that controls for gender,
age, education level, and managerial experience—similar to the third cell defined above. When
using Mincer regressions to estimate reference wages researchers need to find appropriate exclusion
restrictions, meaning at least a variable that influences reference wages but not happiness. Notice
that computing cell averages is equivalent to running a Mincer wage regression where the regressors
are fully interacted with each other. In this case the identification hinges on these interactions,
which, like the exclusion restrictions, are assumed to influence reference wages but not happiness.
The bottom panel of Table 1 displays summary statistics for workers’ own wages and self-
reported reference wages, as well as comparison wages defined according to the various methods
employed in the literature. The table shows that average wages estimated from the BSWS external
database are less than 2 percent higher than self-reported reference wages but about 10 percent
higher than workers’ own wages. We attribute this significant difference in the second case to the
inclusion of workers with a general assistant manager position (kacho in Japanese) in the BSWS
data. In contrast, our dataset only includes wage information for employees in non-supervisory,
assistant manager positions. This technical subtlety evinces how difficult it can be to compare wage
averages across different datasets, which may pose challenges to the use of external databases in
the construction of reference wage measures. In addition, self-reported reference wages seem to
be significantly more disperse than any of the other measures utilized in the literature. Averaging
wages across workers with similar given characteristics may not reflect accurately, for example,
how undervalued a worker feels in the labor market. This is further confirmed in Figure 2, where
we plot the kernel density of various wage measures. Comparing self-reported reference wages
and reference wages constructed from an external data source, for example, illustrates a potential
underlying pessimism among Japanese workers regarding their beliefs of what their peers earn. If
feelings like this are common among workers, studies utilizing such theoretical constructs would
underestimate the effects of comparison wages on workers’ self-reported levels of well-being.
The data also hint at a potential underlying pessimism in workers’ perceptions of their peers’
wages, as suggested by the 10-percentage point difference between self-reported reference wages
and workers’ own wages. This is an important point since a worker’s belief of his peers’ wages
may be endogenous, for example, if a relatively happier individual has a more optimistic view
of his own salary relative to his colleagues’. Conversely, a pessimistic worker may think that he
is underpaid with respect to his peers. With panel data, assuming there was enough variation
over time in happiness, wages and relative wages, one could difference out time-invariant worker
characteristics, such as pessimism, and obtain unbiased estimates of the effect of absolute and
relative wages on happiness. As our dataset does not allow us to track individuals over time, we
address this problem by using answers to two questions in our survey that are likely to capture
17The data can be obtained from the following website: http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/database/db-l/.
9
workers’ pessimistic attitudes along two different dimensions. The first question asks whether a
worker believes that his colleagues would help him in times of need; the second question asks the
worker if he is satisfied about the possibility of promotion within his company. Controlling for
these two effects should capture the level of inherent pessimism of a given worker, which should in
turn quell some of the above-mentioned endogeneity concerns.
Having introduced the data, the next section presents the main results. It is important to
remark that, in spite of their virtues, self-reported reference wage measures are not a panacea and
continue to leave some issues unresolved. For instance, by asking workers to report what they
believe that other employees with their same characteristics and in the same job earn, the survey
restricts workers to confine their reference group to individuals within their same job. Still, on a
more regular basis, workers may potentially compare themselves to relatives, friends, or colleagues
doing other jobs. Moreover, the relevant reference group may not be stable over time. For instance,
a recent graduate may compare himself to other recent graduates; but a person who has been out
of school for 10 years may compare himself to former classmates and colleagues, to supervisees and
supervisors, and even to former selves.18 Nonetheless, we believe that self-reported comparison
wage data are a superior alternative to reference wage measures constructed from Mincer equations
or cell averages, since self-reported refrence wages do not limit the worker’s reference group to some
cell average, do not assume that individuals compute their peers’ wages the way econometricians
do, and do not hinge on disputable identifying restrictions (see Section 5).
4 Results
To empirically test the relative utility hypothesis, we estimate a version of equation 1 that substi-
tutes our self-reported reference wage measure, y¯∗i , for the standard proxy used in the literature,
y¯i.
19 As discussed in Section 3.1, there are important differences between male and female workers
in almost every dimension from wages to hours worked to educational attainment, which justifies
our estimation of equation 1 for men and women separately. Pooling the male and female subsam-
ples does not have any significant qualitative impact on our findings. The errors ui are allowed to
be correlated within firms although different clusterings do not affect our conclusions.
The results in Table 3 find strong empirical support in favor of the relative utility hypothesis:
holding wages constant, individuals tend to report lower levels of satisfaction when they perceive
that their peers’ wages are higher. In particular, if a worker believes that his peers’ wages have risen
by one standard deviation, his happiness level would decrease by 0.10 standard deviations. On the
other hand, the absolute wage coefficient is consistently positive and significant at conventional
levels, which implies that a worker’s reported happiness increases as his wage goes up. The
results suggest that a one-standard-deviation increase in a worker’s own wage would lead to an
increase in happiness of 0.13 standard deviations. This finding is reminiscent of the conclusion
by Alesina et al. (2004) that “money buys happiness.” Given that the impact of absolute wages
on subjective well-being is stronger than that of relative wages, an across-the-board wage hike of,
say, 10 percent would be associated with an overall increase in reported happiness. This finding is
confirmed by an F -test that rejects the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients on absolute
and relative wages is equal to zero at conventional levels.
The absolute and the relative wage effects are substantially larger for males. A comparison
18On this and other related issues, see Senik (2009).
19Section 5 discusses the consequences of estimating equation 1 using a mismeasured version of the “true” relative
wage benchmark used by workers.
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between columns 5 and 6 shows that both the absolute and the comparison wage coefficients are
about 35 to 50 percent stronger for men. This implies that women do not derive as much utility as
men do either from their own labor earnings or their perception of their peers’ wages. Nonetheless,
in agreement with the literature, women generally report higher levels of life satisfaction ceteris
paribus, as the results for the pooled sample in column 7 suggest.
Individual worker characteristics explain a significant amount of the variation in reported levels
of life satisfaction. For instance, in the case of males, the inclusion of age, educational attainment,
marital status, and dummies for whether the worker has a blue-collar position and whether it
performs any managerial tasks in the company, increases the coefficient of determination of the
regression from 2 to 7 percent.20 The inclusion of these individual worker characteristics reduces the
absolute wage coefficient by about 22 percent, although the impact of wages on happiness remains
positive and strongly significant. Such reduction in the magnitude of the own wage coefficient is
unsurprising given that standard Mincerian analysis has proven these individual characteristics to
be important determinants of wages.
Pessimism seems to be an important individual trait that affects a worker’s sense of well-
being.21 Pessimistic attitudes about the helpfulness of co-workers and about the possibilities of
job promotions have large and significant negative effects on life satisfaction. These effects are of
similar magnitude for both men and women. As discussed in Section 3.1, the inclusion of these
two pessimism variables attempts to minimize concerns about wage endogeneity. Controlling for
pessimistic attitudes leads to small decreases (in absolute value) in the magnitudes of both the
own and the comparison wage coefficients. However, in both cases, the direction and magnitude
of each of these effects are preserved. Additionally, these two pessimism variables by themselves
explain an extra 4 percent of the variation in life satisfaction, which corroborates the relevance of
a worker’s individual characteristics in the determination of subjective well-being.
To verify that the relationship between happiness and both absolute and relative wages is
not spurious, we investigate other channels through which these links may arise. Things like a
company’s wage structure, pay raises, and worker mobility within the establishment may affect
how satisfied workers are with the salary they and their co-workers perceive. For instance, several
authors have argued that high average wages within the company may provide a signal to the worker
about his ability to rise within the firm’s wage ladder Hirschman and Rothschild (1973); Manski
(2000); Senik (2004); Clark et al. (2009b). If the worker believes that he has greater possibilities
of increasing his compensation in the future, the negative impact of higher peers’ wages would
decrease in absolute terms. In other words, omitting average wages in a happiness regression
would overestimate the comparison wage effect. Moreover, greater wage dispersion within the firm
may also have a significant impact both on satisfaction and on the effect of absolute and relative
wages on happiness. For instance, if workers know that there is greater variance in compensation
packages offered by their company, that may influence how they feel about their relative rank in
the wage spectrum Brown et al. (2008).
We explore these possibilities by controlling for the logarithm of average wages and the in-
terquartile range of log wages within the firm. As expected, higher average wages have a positive
effect on reported levels of life satisfaction—although this effect is statistically significant only in
the case of male workers. In contrast, greater inequality has a negative and significant impact
20Many previous studies control for both age and tenure in subjective well-being regressions. In our case, we opt
to exclude tenure as a regressor because of the high correlation of this variable with age due to the characteristic
seniority tenure system in the Japanese labor force described in Section 3.1.2.
21On a related issue, Stutzer (2004) found that higher income aspirations reduce individuals’ life satisfaction. See
also Frey and Stutzer (2010).
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on happiness for women, while it has no effect on men. Using the pooled sample, neither mean
wages nor wage dispersion have a statistically significant effect on life satisfaction. In all cases,
the inclusion of these variables has no discernible impact on the own wage and the reference wage
coefficients; that is, the relative utility results continue to hold.
4.1 Heterogeneity in Wage Effects
We have now confirmed that the negative correlation between reference wages and subjective well-
being holds even after accounting for a number of individual worker characteristics and controlling
for other factors that may potentially explain away this relationship. In this section, we now
explore in further detail one additional possible mechanism that may link these two variables.
Perhaps the most logical or straightforward reason that may justify such relationship is jealousy.
Workers who like to compare themselves to other workers or who care about what their peers earn
are likely to be better informed about the prevalent wage differentials at any given time. If this is
true, workers who make smaller prediction errors should suffer greater disutility from any increases
in wages earned by their peers.
To test this, we first calculate a worker’s wage prediction accuracy and then estimate the
impacts of comparison wages on his reported levels of life satisfaction. We define such prediction
accuracy as the percentage difference (in levels) between the peer wage reported by the worker
(i.e., his belief) and the wage average within each worker group or cell identified by the age of
the worker, his gender, and his education level.22 We sort the whole subsample of male workers
by their prediction accuracy, and then group them into four broad categories, ranging from worst
(i.e., 1st quartile of workers) to best (i.e., workers in the top 5 percent of predictors). Finally, we
re-estimate the SWB equations for each of these groups, including the full set of controls that were
accounted for in column 5 of Table 3.
The results appear in Table 4. The estimates corroborate our initial hypothesis that better
predictors are more severely affected by changes in their peers’ wages. Those who fare worst at
predicting the wage of other workers with similar characteristics, do experience negative disutility
from an increase in their peers’ wages, although this effect is smallest relative to that of other
workers who are more accurate in their predictions. The differences in these reference wage effects
over well-being are large. For instance, workers in the the top 5 percent according to their prediction
accuracy experience a negative impact on life satisfaction that is 5 times as large as that reported
by workers in the bottom 25 percent of the sample (-0.21 for worst predictors vs. -1.06 for best
predictors).
Moreover, good predictors not only care more about their peers’ wages, but also about their
own. The differences in these own wage effects are also relatively large: about three times as large
for best predictors compared to worst predictors. Nonetheless, these increases in the own wage
effect as workers’ prediction accuracy improves are not as marked as those observed for reference
wages. One possible interpretation of this finding is that better predictors experience stronger
feelings of jealousy, and so increases in their peers’ wages will outweigh any increase in well-being
they may get from a similar rise in their own wage. In turn, this result may imply that workers
who care more about their peers’ and their own wages will be more likely to be better informed
about job offers and the wage structure in their profession.
As an additional remark, the estimates in Table 4 suggest that one cannot ignore cultural
differences when comparing reference and own wage effects on well-being across studies that use
22Although we continue to focus on the male subsample only, in this calculation we control for gender because
we expect male workers to compare themselves more often to other male, not female, peers.
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different samples, especially if the data employed correspond to individuals in different countries.
In Section 5.2, we compare our findings with those in previous literature keeping this caveat in
mind. Before we do that, we corroborate the robustness of our results in the following section.
4.2 Robustness Checks for Self-reported Reference Wages
For brevity we show our robustness checks for the male sample only. Table 5 shows that our
main results hold when we consider alternative specifications. For the sake of comparison, col-
umn 1 shows our preferred specification from Table 3, which includes individual characteristics
(not shown), underlying pessimism, and firm’s average wages and wage dispersion, with the addi-
tion of industry fixed effects. As is shown in column 2, accounting for year fixed effects, instead of
industry fixed effects, leaves our main results unchanged.
In column 3, we address a possible endogeneity issue: a worker’s reference group might depend
on the company the worker chooses to work for, and unobserved amenities within the company
might be correlated with both wages, reference wages, and happiness. Even though these companies
are large23 and might thus have more than one establishment, company fixed effects will also
capture average neighborhood characteristics. There is no evidence that these endogeneities alter
our results. Controlling for company fixed effects leaves them practically unchanged.
In column 4 we perform a horse-race between self-reported reference wage and the reference
wage from external data (see Section 3.1.3). The coefficient on the external reference wage has
the right sign and is significantly different from zero, but, most importantly, the coefficient on the
self-reported reference wages is practically unchanged. One possibility for the negative sign on
the external reference wage is that it proxies for the worker’s permanent wages. The difference
between the own wage and the external reference wage will thus proxy for unexpected positive
shocks to income.24
In column 5, we use an ordered probit instead of the OLS. The coefficients are not directly
comparable with the OLS ones but the relative size of the coefficient on wages and the one on
reference wages can be compared and the results are basically unchanged.25 This result is in
agreement with findings by Luttmer (2005) that the use of least-squares estimators in happiness
studies does not impact negatively the general conclusions, even when ordered probit or logit
models would be methodologically preferred given the hierarchical and non-linear nature of the
dependent variable.
Column 6 shows that using job satisfaction as our subjective well-being measure does not alter
the main findings: the coefficient on absolute wages, although slightly smaller in magnitude, is
positive, strongly significant, and greater in absolute terms than the reference wage coefficient. As
expected, the latter estimate is negative and significant at the 1 percent level.
23We observe approximately 90,000 workers and 62 firms, which means that each company has on average 1,500
workers.
24We thank Angus Deaton for pointing out this possibility.
25Nevertheless, the coefficients turn out to be similar in magnitude to the OLS case partly because the root mean
squared error of the baseline regression is 1.04 and thus close to unity, to which the error term in the latent model
of the ordered probit is normalized.
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5 Testing the Relative Utility Hypothesis Using Constructed
Reference Wages
In the previous section, we used reference wages reported by workers to demonstrate how robust
is the negative relationship between these self-reported reference wages and well-being. However,
self-reported reference wages are not always available. Instead, most tests of the relative utility
hypothesis found in the literature generally rely on reference wage measures constructed as some
average wage defined in various ways, as discussed in Sections 2 and 3. In this section, we inves-
tigate whether these alternate wage measures deviate from the comparison wage benchmark truly
perceived by workers, and if so, whether these differences introduce any significant biases in the
estimated impacts of reference wages on well-being.
To preview our results, the findings below show that, in general, the estimated effect of reference
wages on well-being is not consistent when using constructed reference wages as proxies for the truly
perceived comparison wage. Although the theory suggests that the direction of the bias introduced
cannot be determined, our empirical estimates show slightly smaller reference wage effects when
we define this comparison wage variable using different types of cell averages. However, when
reference wages are constructed from Mincer regressions, the estimated effects are vastly different
from those suggested by all of our previous estimates, and highly unstable. We attribute these
significant discrepancies to the difficulty in finding valid exclusion restrictions to justify the Mincer
approach.
5.1 Revisiting the Subjective Well-Being Regressions
To investigate how the use of constructed reference wage measures may affect the empirical tests
of the relative utility hypothesis, we first re-estimate the regressions in Table 3, now substituting
the self-reported reference wage variable with the alternate measures used in the literature. The
estimates are shown in Table 6. The first regression uses self-reported reference wages and produces
estimates similar to the ones shown earlier in Table 3. The coefficients in columns 2-4 are derived
from specifications that construct reference wages using various cell definitions. Cell 1 is defined
by the age and education level of the worker and the average is computed using our own wage data.
Cells 2 and 3 are both defined by the age of the worker, his educational attainment, and whether
he is responsible for any managerial tasks within his company. The difference between these two
averages is that cell average 2 is also computed from our own wage data, while cell average 3 uses
the external BSWS wage database described in Section 3. Finally, the reference wage in column 5
comes from a standard Mincer regression similar to the ones shown in Table 2.
The results suggest that life satisfaction regressions that use constructed reference wages instead
of self-reported ones do produce somewhat different results. The top panel illustrates how the
raw effects of own and reference wages change when using alternate comparison wage measures,
and so these first five specifications do not control for individual worker characteristics. In the
case of specifications that use cell averages, both the own wage and the reference wage effects
are always about 20-30 percent smaller in absolute value relative to the benchmark estimates.
However, although the differences between each of the own wage and reference wage coefficients
in columns 2-4 and the analogous estimates in column 1 are statistically significant, all of these
coefficients are important in a statistical sense and the suggested directions of these effects are
preserved. By contrast, the specification that uses Mincer-constructed reference wages tells a
different story. Although the estimated own wage effect is positive and statistically significant, as
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before, the coefficient is 85 percent smaller than the one derived from a specification that uses self-
reported reference wages. Moreover, the estimated impact of reference wages on life satisfaction is
more than twice the size of the corresponding coefficient in column 1, and positive, which contrasts
with the suggested effects in all of the previous specifications.
These findings are echoed in the bottom panel of the table, where we re-estimate the same five
equations, this time controlling for worker individual characteristics. As shown in Table 3, the
inclusion of these regressors slightly lowers the magnitude of both the own wage and the reference
wage coefficients, although the general results are preserved. Once again, the estimates derived
from regressions that use constructed reference wages are somewhat smaller in absolute value
than the corresponding benchmark coefficients obtained when self-reported reference wages are
employed instead. Nonetheless, the own wage effect on life satisfaction continues to be positive,
the negative impact of reference wages on well-being persists, and all of the coefficients are strongly
significant. The stark difference in the results is given, once more, by the specification with Mincer-
constructed reference wages. This time, the size, direction, and statistical significance of the own
wage coefficient are almost identical to those obtained using cell averages. Similar to specification 5
in the top panel that did not control for individual characteristics, the estimated reference wage
effect under the Mincer approach continues to be positive, although the coefficient is statistically
indistinguishable from zero.
In sum, empirical tests of the relative utility hypothesis that employ reference wage measures
constructed by the econometrician imply reference wage effects on subjective well-being that devi-
ate somewhat from those estimated when self-reported reference wages are used. In what follows,
we attempt to uncover the reasons behind this bias.
5.2 Estimating the Bias
To better understand the differences described above, we utilize a generalized version of a the
standard classical measurement error model. Recall that equation 1 gives the relationship between
subjective well-being and the reference wage variable, y¯i. Now, suppose that the reference wage
variable employed is a mismeasured version of the worker’s correct perception of what his peers
earn, y¯∗i . That is,
(2) y¯i = α0 + β0y¯
∗
i + i.
This represents a generalization of the classical measurement error model, where α0 = 0 and β0 = 1.
We believe this generalization is appropriate in our case because the data suggest that reported
reference wages differ significantly depending on workers’ wage levels. For instance, people with
low wages systematically perceive that their peers earn more than they do; that is, y¯∗i > y¯i for
low earners, which would imply that α0 > 0 and β0 < 1. Similar to the classical measurement
error model, we assume that the error term is orthogonal to the true reference wage, and that the
relationship between the latter and the mismeasured variable is linear.
Substituting equation 2 into equation 1 obtains:
(3) SWBi = α1yi + β1(β0y¯
∗
i + i) + x
′
i
γ + β1α0 + ui.
In such a model, a bias arises as a function of both the variance of the  residuals and the distance
between β0 and 1. To see this, assume for simplicity that subjective well-being does not depend
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on worker individual characteristics.26 In this case, the probability limit of the OLS estimate of
β1 is
plim β̂ols1 =
cov(β0y¯
∗ + , SWB)
var(β0y¯∗ + )
=
β0cov(y¯
∗, SWB)
β20var(y¯
∗) + var()
= β1
β0
β20 + var()/var(y¯
∗)
The equation above suggests that, in general, β̂ols1 is not a consistent estimator of the true effect
of comparison wages on subjective well-being when constructed reference wages are used. This
statement is true as long as β0 is different from β
2
0 + var()/var(y¯
∗). Moreover, unless we can
accurately determine whether β0 is above or below 1, the direction of the bias is ambiguous.
Can we use instrumental variables (IV) to consistently estimate β̂ols1 ? In the classical mea-
surement error model, an IV estimator would normally get rid of the bias introduced by the
mismeasurement of the independent variable. By contrast, in the generalized version of the model,
an IV approach does not lead to a consistent estimate of β̂ols1 , although it does allow us to bound
the estimated effect. To see this, suppose that there are two independent proxies of y¯∗, proxy a
and proxy b. We can then use proxy a as an instrument for proxy b:
(4) plim β̂iv1 =
cov(βa0 y¯
∗ + a, SWB)
cov(βa0 y¯
∗ + a, βb0y¯
∗ + b)
=
cov(y¯∗, SWB)
βb0var(y¯
∗)
=
β1
βb0
.
The expression above implies that an IV estimate of β1 would still be biased, although now this
bias depends only on the distance between βb0 and 1, not on the variance of the  residuals. Taking
the ratio between β̂iv1 and β̂
ols
1 one can see that whenever OLS and IV give similar results, the
signal-to-noise ratio var(y¯∗)/var() will be large. Unfortunately, β0 might still be different from
one and bias both estimates. Since workers with low wages tend to report a reference wage that
is higher than their own wage, and vice versa, the regression of predicted reference wages on self-
reported ones shows a positive constant term and a slope that is smaller than one. The IV estimate
will thus tend to be larger, in absolute value, than the true coefficient.
Table 7 compares the OLS and the IV estimates. The OLS regressions are identical to the
ones that appear in Panel A of Table 6 and are shown to facilitate the comparison with the IV
estimates. The four OLS regressions are exactly the same, except each uses a different reference
wage measure. The analogous results for Panel B are not reproduced for brevity. We focus on
estimations that use self-reported and constructed reference wages since, as discussed above, these
coefficients are stable across specifications. Results that use reference wages derived from Mincer
regressions are explored further in Table 8 below.
The findings confirm the corresponding effects that own wages and reference wages have on
life satisfaction. In all cases, each of the IV estimates is statistically indistinguishable from the
OLS estimate obtained when self-reported reference wages are employed. Looking at equation 4,
the direct implication of this is that β̂0 is very close to 1, and that the IV coefficients do provide
an unbiased estimate of the effect of reference wages on subjective well-being. Of course, it is
possible that this result may not be generalizable to other similar databases measuring well-being
and wages for different populations in other regions or countries. A generalized result, though,
is that the IV procedure gets rid of one of the sources of bias. In our case, this is shown by the
26The results below do not hinge on this assumption. Using the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem we could al-
ternatively work with the residuals of a projection onto the space orthogonal to the individual characteristics.
Alternatively we can derive the coefficient for y¯∗ independently from x if self-reported reference wages are not de-
pendent on workers’ individual characteristics. The data suggest that this is a reasonable assumption. For instance,
compare columns 1 and 2 in Table 3, and note that the estimated self-reported reference wage does not change
when worker characteristics are introduced.
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significant differences between each of the IV coefficients and the OLS regression that employs
the corresponding mismeasured (constructed) reference wage measure. Moreover, with respect
to the own wage effects, we observe that the IV coefficient is always somewhat larger than the
corresponding OLS estimate. We attribute this result to the construction of the reference wage
measure used in the OLS regressions as some average of the own wage variable. In this case, the
inclusion of another variable that accounts for the mean wage of some subsample of the population
that has similar characteristics to the worker’s would most likely absorb some of the effect that
would otherwise be (correctly) attributed to the own wage variable.
5.3 Understanding Mincer-Predicted Reference Wages
Thus far, our findings have been quite robust to different specifications and subsamples. They have
also been relatively stable when using alternate definitions of comparison wages, except in the case
of Mincer-predicted reference wages. In this section, we further investigate this discrepancy and
argue that one of the main reasons behind the instability of the Mincer reference wage effects on
subjective well-being is the indiscriminate use of exclusion restrictions that may not necessarily
help accurately identify the reference wage effect. A proper instrument should be able to predict
a reference wage, or define a reference group without influencing life satisfaction.27
Table 8 displays results for various tests of the relative utility hypothesis according to other
papers in the literature that construct reference wages following a Mincer approach. Each column
shows the own wage and the reference wage coefficients we obtain by running a specification as
close as possible to the one employed in each of the papers, but using our own data. We also
report the direction and significance of the reference wage effect on well-being that the respective
authors obtain in their paper using their own data.
The differences in the estimated reference wage effects, both across specifications and across
samples, are striking. First, the coefficients vary significantly depending on the specification, going
from -0.41 to 0.64. Thus, the discrepancies arise not only in the magnitude of the coefficients,
but also in the direction of the estimated effect. Such large variation in the implied impact of
reference wages on well-being is surprising given that the underlying sample is exactly the same
and the only thing that changes is the exclusion restriction assumed to identify the reference
wage effect. Second, note how the same (or nearly the same) specification produces very different
results from those reported in the original papers for their respective samples. For instance,
while Sloane and Williams (2000) find a positive and insignificant effect of reference wages on
well-being when they control for variables such as hours worked, tenure, marital status, and union
management experience in the Mincer equation, we obtain a negative and very significant coefficient
using the same specification for our sample.
We believe that what gives rise to such disparate results is the indiscriminate use of different
exclusion restrictions and the unjustified categorization of variables as belonging in either the
Mincer or the well-being equation. As noted earlier, the fact that our findings are quite robust
to different specifications, including those that use various constructed reference wages, suggests
that something not inherently related to the estimation of the subjective well-being equation may
be driving the Mincer results. Under the Mincer framework, it is up to the econometrician to
decide whether a given variable belongs in one or the other equation. For example, some of the
authors that follow the Mincer approach have used different combinations of variables including
27A recent paper by Card et al. (2010) does this in a clever way by using randomized manipulation of access to
information on peers’ wages.
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age, education, and marital status in their exclusion equations, even when these variables have
shown to be both economically and statistically relevant in the subjective well-being equation.
Of course, it is also possible that the discrepancies outlined above are due to other reasons.
For instance, different papers use different samples. It is possible that the estimated reference
wage effects on well-being are stronger or weaker, depending on the working population. It is
also entirely possible that the “tunnel effects” described in Section 2 are more prevalent in other
populations. Moreover, note that, for the sake of comparison, we are restricting our estimations
to the same sample of male workers with which we have worked throughout the paper. Other
papers in the literature have pooled males and females and used individuals that differ in their
characteristics from our sample of unionized workers employed by large, publicly-listed firms in
Japan. Nonetheless, estimations using different working subsamples (not reported for brevity)
produce results that are, in some cases, significantly different from the ones reported for each of
the specifications in the table, which further underlines the instability of the Mincer estimates.
Summing up, the results above suggest that the use of constructed reference wages in empirical
tests of the utility hypothesis produces inconsistent estimates of the effects of comparison wages
on subjective well-being. Our theoretical framework demonstrates that, in the presence of several
mismeasured proxies of the reference wage that is truly perceived by the worker, an instrumental
variables approach may help bound the comparison wage estimate, although it does not eliminate
the bias entirely. An evaluation of the various empirical constructs that the literature has previously
used shows that various cell wage averages, computed both within our own dataset and from an
external wage data source, perform best in the estimation of the reference wage effects compared
to the self-reported reference wage measure. However, the use of Mincer-predicted reference wages
obtains reference wage effects that are unstable due to multicollinearity that ad hoc exclusion
restrictions typically do not solve. It is thus advised that these Mincer-predicted reference wages
are employed with care.
6 Conclusions
The results in this article find strong support for the relative utility hypothesis. Using data
on self-reported reference wages, we observe that individuals report lower levels of both life and
job satisfaction when they perceive that their co-workers earn higher salaries. However, unlike
Easterlin (1974), we find that the association between absolute wage effects and subjective well-
being is economically stronger than that between the latter and comparison wages.
Our analysis also shows that standard methods employed in the literature to estimate reference
income measures yield inconsistent estimators of the reference income effect. Nonetheless, we
demonstrate that these theoretical approaches do not suffer from the classical measurement error
problem, and that the bias in the estimated relative effects cannot be signed. More particularly, we
show that linear predictions of benchmark wage measures obtained by Mincer estimations perform
poorly. This is mainly due to weak identifying assumptions of the comparison wage effect and a
strong multicollinearity problem between predicted wages and the rest of the individual worker
characteristics. In contrast, cell averages based on age, gender, and education levels and estimated
using external datasets generate more reliable results.
From a practical point of view, our findings strengthen the case to increase resources that
improve the quality of surveys and data collection on life happiness. Relative wage effects have
obvious consequences in redistributive policies, both within a firm in the form of salary increases,
as within a country in the shape of tax considerations. Only through a better understanding
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of these potential externalities on workers can firms and governments ameliorate the design of
welfare-enhancing pay schedules and fiscal programs.
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Table 1: Summary statisticsa
Whole Working subsamples
sample All Males Females
Worker characteristics
Age (years) 34.926 34.676 35.921 30.153
(9.96) (9.64) (9.58) (8.46)
Tenure (years) 13.870 13.525 14.554 9.786
(10.3) (9.94) (10.11) (8.3)
Middle school [0,1] 0.069 0.044 0.048 0.029
(0.25) (0.2) (0.21) (0.17)
High school [0,1] 0.464 0.474 0.480 0.454
(0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5)
Technical school [0,1] 0.024 0.025 0.024 0.030
(0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.17)
Some college [0,1] 0.095 0.095 0.042 0.286
(0.29) (0.29) (0.2) (0.45)
College [0,1] 0.270 0.283 0.315 0.167
(0.44) (0.45) (0.46) (0.37)
Post-graduate [0,1] 0.067 0.067 0.081 0.015
(0.25) (0.25) (0.27) (0.12)
Married [0,1] 0.581 0.583 0.653 0.329
(0.493) (0.493) (0.476) (0.469)
Blue collar [0,1] 0.341 0.336 0.369 0.219
(0.47) (0.47) (0.48) (0.41)
Managerial tasks [0,1] 0.171 0.181 0.225 0.023
(0.38) (0.39) (0.42) (0.15)
Hours worked (monthly overtime) 22.679 23.235 26.404 11.718
(19.83) (20.38) (21.16) (11.34)
Life satisfaction (1=lowest. . . 5=highest) 3.274 3.270 3.202 3.516
(1.1) (1.1) (1.11) (1.04)
Job satisfaction (1=lowest. . . 5=highest) 3.066 3.070 3.085 3.017
(0.93) (0.93) (0.94) (0.91)
Wage datab
Own wages 15.401 15.405 15.508 15.028
(0.42) (0.42) (0.37) (0.37)
Self-reported reference wages 15.486 15.491 15.583 15.155
(0.41) (0.41) (0.37) (0.38)
Cell wage average from our datac 15.401 15.405 15.508 15.028
(0.35) (0.34) (0.28) (0.25)
Cell wage average from external datac 15.501 15.508 15.612 15.133
(0.35) (0.34) (0.29) (0.23)
Mincer-predicted wagesd 15.406 15.405 15.508 15.028
(0.26) (0.26) (0.16) (0.21)
Observations 91896 78136 61278 16858
aFor each worker characteristic, first number corresponds to sample average; second number (in parentheses)
corresponds to standard deviation.
bWage figures are in 2005 Japanese yen and are reported in logs.
cCells defined as gender × age × education level.
dPredicted wages from a Mincer regression that controls for age, tenure, gender, education level, managerial
task, blue collar, job shock, occupation, industry, hours worked, marital status, and year fixed effects.
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Table 2: Mincer regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Males Females
Dependent variable: Fixed effects:
Annual income Industry Company Industry Company
+Year +Year +Year +Year
Age in years 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age squared -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Tenure in years 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Tenure squared -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Middle school [0,1] -0.14*** -0.08*** -0.06*** -0.19*** -0.11*** -0.08***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Technical school [0,1] -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.06***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Some college [0,1] 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.06***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
College [0,1] 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.25*** 0.21*** 0.19***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Post-graduate [0,1] 0.20*** 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.42*** 0.35*** 0.33***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Other degree [0,1] -0.06 -0.08*** -0.05*** -0.08** -0.12*** -0.11***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Hours worked (monthly overtime) 0.02* 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Married [0,1] 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.01 -0.00 -0.01*
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Managerial tasks [0,1] 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.15***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Blue collar [0,1] -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.09***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 61278 61278 61278 16858 16858 16858
Adjusted R-squared 0.664 0.723 0.755 0.538 0.598 0.636
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. All wage measures and hours worked reported in logs.
High school education dummy excluded from regression.
24
Table 3: Testing the relative utility hypothesis using self-reported reference wages
Dependent variable: Males Females All
Life satisfaction (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Own wage 0.69*** 0.54*** 0.46*** 0.42*** 0.43*** 0.26*** 0.40***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03)
Self-reported reference wage -0.39*** -0.38*** -0.30*** -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.16*** -0.26***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Hours worked (monthly overtime) -0.02 -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.08*** -0.06***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Firm’s average wages 0.11* 0.09 -0.03 0.05
(0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06)
Firm’s wage interquartile range -0.09 -0.19** -0.12*
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Pessimism about -0.37*** -0.37*** -0.37*** -0.41*** -0.38***
colleagues’ helpfulness (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Pessimism about -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.15*** -0.21***
future promotions (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Female [0,1] 0.43***
(0.02)
Age (years) -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age squared (/100) 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Married [0,1] 0.61*** 0.60*** 0.61*** 0.61*** 0.43*** 0.56***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Middle school [0,1] 0.08*** 0.07** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08 0.08**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.11) (0.03)
Technical school [0,1] 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.08** 0.08** 0.04 0.07**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
Some college [0,1] 0.04* 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.17*** 0.13***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
College [0,1] 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.18*** 0.14***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Post-graduate [0,1] 0.22*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.22*** 0.17***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)
Other degree [0,1] 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 -0.05 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Managerial tasks [0,1] 0.01 -0.03* -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.03*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02)
Blue collar [0,1] -0.04** -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* -0.10*** -0.04***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
Observations 61278 61278 61278 61278 61278 16858 78136
Adjusted R-squared 0.022 0.074 0.111 0.111 0.111 0.087 0.117
Own wage + reference wage = 0?
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.113 0.001
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. All wage measures and hours worked reported in logs.
High school education dummy excluded from regression. Except for column (1), all specifications account for
industry fixed effects.
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Table 4: Effects of own wages and self-reported reference wages on life satisfaction by accuracy of
workers’ prediction of peers’ wages
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Life satisfaction Prediction accuracy (quartile)
1 2+3 4 Top 5%
Own wage 0.24*** 0.66*** 0.63*** 0.65***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.13)
Self-reported reference wage -0.21*** -0.58*** -0.91*** -1.06***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.13) (0.32)
Observations 14216 30174 17588 3702
Adjusted R-squared 0.060 0.077 0.088 0.089
Own wage + reference wage = 0?
p value 0.678 0.260 0.028 0.171
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. All wage measures and hours worked reported in logs.
Prediction accuracy defined as the percentage difference (in levels) between peer reference wage reported by
worker and wage average by cell defined as age × gender × education. All specifications control for individual
worker characteristics including age, age squared, marital status, education level, managerial and blue collar
dummies, as well as firm’s average wages, firm’s wage interquartile range, and industry fixed effects.
26
Table 5: Robustness tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
External Ordered
Benchmark Year Year+Firm ref. wage probit
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction Job sat.
Own wage 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.41*** 0.43*** 0.42*** 0.25***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Self-reported reference wage -0.29*** -0.30*** -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.30*** -0.17***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Hours worked (monthly overtime) -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.03**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Firm’s average wages 0.09 0.13* 0.09 0.09 0.15*
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
Firm’s wage interquartile range -0.09 -0.14* -0.09 -0.10 -0.13
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
Pessimism about colleagues’ helpfulness [0,1] -0.37*** -0.37*** -0.37*** -0.37*** -0.38*** -0.38***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Pessimism about future promotions [0,1] -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.21*** -0.44***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Cell wage average from external data -0.14*
(0.07)
Fixed effects Industry Year Year+Firm Industry Industry Industry
Observations 61278 61278 61278 61278 61278 61278
Adjusted R-squared 0.111 0.111 0.114 0.111 0.040a 0.121
Own wage + reference wage = 0?
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. All wage measures and hours worked reported in logs. All specifications control for age, age
squared, education level, marital status, manager and blue collar positions.
aAdjusted R-squared not available; pseudo R-squared reported instead.
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Table 6: Testing the relative utility hypothesis using alternate reference wage measures
Panel A. Without individual characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: Reference wage:
Life satisfaction Self-reported Cell average 1 Cell average 2 Cell average 3 Mincer
Own wage 0.67*** 0.49*** 0.48*** 0.52*** 0.10**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Reference wage -0.39*** -0.22*** -0.20*** -0.26*** 0.85***
(0.03) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.13)
Observations 61278 61278 61278 61278 61278
Adjusted R-squared 0.025 0.021 0.019 0.020 0.024
Panel B. With individual characteristics
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Own wage 0.54*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.36***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Reference wage -0.38*** -0.18*** -0.15*** -0.28*** 0.06
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.14)
Observations 61278 61278 61278 61278 61278
Adjusted R-squared 0.074 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. All wage measures reported in logs. All specifications control for (log)
hours worked and industry fixed effects. Specifications in bottom panel additionally account for individual worker characteristics including age, age
squared, marital status, education level, managerial and blue collar dummies. Cell averages 1 and 2 calculated from our own data set and defined as (age ×
gender × education) and (age × gender × education × managerial tasks), respectively. Cell average 3 calculated using BSWS data and defined as (age ×
gender × education × managerial tasks). Mincer reference wage predicted from a standard regression of own wages on age and tenure dummies, hours
worked, education level, marital status, manager, blue collar, job shock, and occupation dummies, as well as industry and year fixed effects.
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Table 7: Use of IV estimates when self-reported reference wages are not available
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Reference wage:
Dependent variable: Self-reported Cell average 1 Cell average 2 Cell average 3
Life satisfaction OLS OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Own wage 0.67*** 0.49*** 0.56*** 0.48*** 0.57*** 0.52*** 0.53***
(0.032) (0.025) (0.033) (0.027) (0.035) (0.026) (0.031)
Reference wage -0.39*** -0.22*** -0.34*** -0.20*** -0.35*** -0.26*** -0.28***
(0.025) (0.049) (0.067) (0.052) (0.069) (0.047) (0.061)
Instrumental variable: Cell av. 3 Cell av. 3 Cell av. 1
Observations 61278 61278 61278 61278 61278 61278 61278
Adjusted R-squared 0.025 0.021 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.020
** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. All wage measures reported in logs. Cell averages 1 and 2 calculated from
our own data set and defined as (age × gender × education) and (age × gender × education × managerial tasks), respectively. Cell average 3 calculated
using BSWS data and defined as (age × gender × education × managerial tasks). All specifications control for (log) hours worked and industry fixed effects.
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Table 8: Impact of different exclusion restrictions on own wage and reference wage coefficients
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Life satisfaction Clark & Oswald (1996)a Sloane & Williams (2000)b Le´vy-Garboua & Montmarquette (2004)c Senik (2004)d
Own wage 0.39*** 0.20*** 0.28*** 0.22***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Mincer-predicted reference wage 0.64*** -0.41*** 0.45*** 0.18**
(0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
Effect of reference income Negative and Positive and Negative and Positive and
in original paper significant insignificant significant significant
Exclusion restriction Age categories Hours worked Age Age, Tenure
Tenure, Tenure squared Tenure, Tenure squared Hours worked Education level
Education level Marital status categories Tenure, Tenure squared Marital status categories
Marital status married female Marital status Managerial tasks
Union management married male Managerial tasks Industry and
Firm and year fixed effects Union management Occupation fixed effects occupation fixed effects
Observations 61278 61278 61278 55801
Adjusted R-squared 0.03 0.14 0.12 0.06
Own wage + reference wage = 0?
p value 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. All wage measures reported in logs. ∗ ∗ ∗p¡0.01,∗ ∗ p¡0.05,∗p¡0.1
a Additional variables in life satisfaction equation include hours worked, age, age squared, managerial tasks, industry and occupation fixed effects.
b Additional variables in life satisfaction equation include hours worked, age, educational attainments, managerial tasks, company fixed effects, six
subjective variables regarding working conditions.
c Additional variables in life satisfaction equation include age categories, educational attainment, job satisfaction, satisfaction with leisure.
d Additional variables in life satisfaction equation include age categories, marital status, family income.
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Table A-1: Literature survey
Mincer wage approach
Authors Clark and Osawald (1996) (i) Sloane and Williams (2000) (ii) Le´vy-Garboua and Montmarquette (2004) (iii) Senik (2004) (iv)
Data characteristics U.K. workers U.K. workers Canadian workers Russia
Dependent variable Job satisfaction Income Job satisfaction Income Job satisfaction Income Happiness Income
Own-income effect Positive Positive Positive Positive
Reference income effect Negative Positive Negative (v) Positive
|Ref. income | > |Own income | ? (vi) Yes ∗∗ No No No ∗ ∗ ∗
Hours worked Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No No
Age Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age squared Yes No No No No No No No
Tenure No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Tenure squared No Yes No Yes No Yes No No
Sex Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Marital Status/Children No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes No No No No No Yes
Occupation No Yes No No No Yes No Yes
Job class/ supervisor Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Table and equation number 4(1) A 8(1) 7 1,2(1) A.1 3(3) A.1
Method Ordered Probit Ordered Probit Ordered Probit Ordered Probit
(i) Other controls in happiness regression; Renter, Has second job, Temporary contract, Health status. Other controls in Mincer equation; Health dummies, Establishment size
dummies, Accident dummies, When work dummies, Sex mix at work dummies, Organization type dummies, Trade Union recognized, Pension member,Incentive payment, Union
member, Part time, Temporary contract.
(ii) Other controls in happiness regression; Temporary contract, Firm size dummies, Part time, Owner-occupier, Promotion prospects, Frequent overtime, Percieved career, 14 Working
condition variables, Manual dummy, Union dummy, Training period, Sex mix at work dummies, Race dummies. Other controls in Mincer equation; Female married, Male married,
Length of training period, Shift work, Merit-related payment, Relevant trade union present, Trade union member, Selectivity, Part time, Temporary contract, Firm size dummies.
(iii) Other controls in happiness regression; Job related satisfactions, Country of birth, Mother tongue, Satisfaction with leisure, Religion. Other controls in Mincer equation;
Canadian borne, Bilingual, Religion, Satisfaction with health, Satisfaction with leisure, Part time.
(iv) Other controls in happiness regression; Lagged individual income, Household income, Household size, Mother tongue, Believer, Round, Health.
(v) Current wage gap (own income minus reference income) and reference income controlled. The difference of the estimate of reference income and that of current wage gap is
negative, indicating negative effect of reference income.
(vi) *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table A-1: Literature survey (continued)
Cell average income from dataset Cell average income from external source Subjective reference income
Authors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Data characteristics Germany U.K. Denmark U.S. U.K. U.S. U.K. and U.S. U.S. Denmark China 29 countries
Dependent variable (i) H. J.S. J.S. J.S. J.S. H. H. H. H. H. H.
Own-income effect Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive
Reference income effect Negative Negative (ii) Positive Negative (iii) Negative Negative Negative Negative Positive Negative Negative (iv)
|Ref. income | > |Own income | ? (v) No ∗∗ N.A. ∗∗ No ∗∗ Yes ∗ Yes ∗∗ Yes ∗∗ N.A. ∗∗ Yes ∗∗ No ∗ ∗ ∗ N.A. ∗ ∗ ∗ N.A.∗ ∗ ∗
Hours worked No Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes No
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age squared Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No
Tenure No No No Yes No No No No No No No
Tenure squared No No No No No No No No No No No
Sex Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Marital Status/Children Yes Yes Yes No aNo Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Industry No Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes
Job class/ supervisor No No Yes No Yes No No No No No Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table and equation number 2 (1) 6A (2) 1 (1) 3 (2) 3 (3) 2 (1) 8 (4-8) 1 (1) 1 (1) 6 (4) 1 (1)
Method (vi) O.P. O.P. O.P. OLS O.P. O.P. O. L. OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), Other controls; Year fixed effects, Familiy income, Number of children at home, Number of adults at home, Living together, Family condition, Social
means (familiy income, years of education, number of children at home, and adults at home), Cell average income defined by (education, age, and region).
(2) Brown et al. (2008), Other controls; Employer size, Race, Temporary job, Mean pay, Pay range, Union recognition at the work place, Cell defined by work place.
(3) Clark et al. (2009b), Other controls; Year fixed effects, Health problem, Plant size, Cell average wages define by plant.
(4) Cappelli and Sherer (1988), Other controls; Layoff, Compare mkt, Compare outside, Compare carrier, Manage info, Union info, Union dues, Participations, Part time, Job
influence, Change work, Change time.
(5) Clark and Oswald (1996), Other controls; Health dummies, Race dummies.
(6) McBride (2001), Other controls; Consumption habituation norm dummies, Race, Health dummies.
(7) Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), Other controls; Year fixed effects, Unemployed, Regional house price index, Household size, Race, Retired, Student, Keeping home.
(8) Luttmer (2005), Other controls; Value of home, Renter, Household size, Population, Non-metropolitan area, Fraction black in PUMA, Religion dummies, Race dummies.
(9) Clark et al. (2009a), Other controls; See neighbors often, Socio-economic groups, Number and ages of children, Years in Grid, Year fixed effects, Health problem.
(10) Knight et al. (2009), Other controls; Net wealth, Health status, Unemployed, Comparison variables, Community variables, Attitude variables, Race dummies.
(11) Senik (2009), Other controls; Family size variables, Owner ship of firms, Member of communist party.
(i) Abbreviations: J.S.; Job satisfaction, H; Happiness.
(ii) Reference income as “wage rank.”
(iii) Reference income as “market wage.”
(iv) Subjective comparison perceptions towards neighbors, family members, friends, and work colleagues.
(v) N.A. when magnitudes are not comparable. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
(vi) Abbreviations: O.P.; Ordered probit, O.L.; Ordered logit.
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Figure 1: Distributions of life happiness and job satisfaction (1=lowest.. 5=highest)
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Figure 2: Density of (log) wages, self-reported reference wages and reference
wages computed from external sources
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